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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
PROPERTY LAW
I. CONDOMINIUM BUYER BOUND BY RESTRICTIONS
IN MASTER DEED AND BYLAWS
In Ortega v. Kingfisher Homeowners Ass'n' the South Carolina Court of
Appeals made it clear that a buyer of a timeshare condominium is bound by
provisions and restrictive covenants contained in the master deed and
accompanying bylaws by signing a sales contract and indenture deed2 that
incorporate those provisions. Despite state statutes requiring timeshare sellers
to reveal certain information to prospective buyers in an effort to discourage
fraud, the court's ruling should not have surprised the plaintiff because it
reflects a well-established tendency to hold the parties in a condominium sale
to provisions and restrictive covenants in the master deed and bylaws.
Kingfisher Homeowners Association (Association) was formed as a
nonprofit corporation in January 1983 to represent the interests of about 2,000
owners of timeshare units at the oceanfront Kingfisher Inn (Inn) in Garden
City, South Carolina. The Inn was organized as a horizontal property regime
under the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act.3 Each owner held title
forever to a space of time of one week or more per year at the Inn. Four new
members were elected in 1987 to the governing board of the Association,
which maintained the common elements of the property. The election was
invalidated, however, after participants realized that a quorum of voting units
was not present. During the next several years, a small group of disgruntled
owners who wanted to oust existing board members filed four lawsuits
protesting election tactics and various provisions of the bylaws.4
Betty Ortega filed her lawsuit in January 1991, a month after board
candidates supported by her and other dissatisfied owners were not chosen
during a special election. She alleged that the board vote provision in the
1. __ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
2. An indenture deed is one in which two or more parties enter into reciprocal and
corresponding grants or obligations toward each other. BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 770 (6th ed.
1990). An indenturedeed is distinguishable from a deed poll which is signed by only the grantor.
In the days before carbon paper and copying machines, grantor and grantee signed duplicate
copies of a deed written on the same piece of parchment. The parchment was then cut in half in
an irregular manner to leave a jagged, or indented. The owners could prove the authenticity of
the deeds at a later date by fitting the two pieces together. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 3 (1983);
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 631 (3d ed. 1993).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31-10 to -440 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
4. Brief of Appellee at 2-12. The Association agreed in a consent order in December 1991
to hold a special election in which the staggered board and board vote provisions would not be
exercised and an entire new slate of five board members would be elected. Candidates supported
by the protesting owners lost by a 4-1 margin. Id. at 21.
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bylaws violated state corporate law because it was neither a proxy provision,5
a voting trust,6 nor a voting agreement.7 The board vote provision called for
a majority of the Association's governing board to vote on behalf of owners
who did not vote in person or file a proxy as allowed under the bylaws.'
Ortega also argued that she should not be bound by the staggered board
provision of the bylaws merely by having signed a purchase agreement and
indenture deed. She noted that developers organize timeshare condominium
projects to ensure that they will exert control over it until the last unit is sold.
Timeshare units are sold on a take it or leave it basis, and Ortega believed she
should not be bound by obscure voting provisions favoring the developer's
interests when those provisions are buried in the fine print of eighty-six pages
of organizational documents. 9 Moreover, Ortega claimed that the Associatio-
n's bylaw provision did not meet South Carolina statutory requirements' ° and
therefore the terms of all members had to expire at each annual meeting. The
trial court dismissed Ortega's action, concluding that neither the board vote
nor the staggered board provision violated state law. "
The court of appeals upheld the trial judge's decision in a two-page per
curiam opinion. The court did not discuss the plaintiff's argument that such
provisions usually are buried in lengthy documents and ignored during high-
pressure sales presentations, 12 but instead pointed to the statutes governing
horizontal property regimes, which mandate condominium owners' compliance
with administrative regulations set forth in the master deed and bylaws. 3 The
board vote provision was a valid voting agreement because it was in writing
and signed by the parties, and a shareholder may give an irrevocable proxy to
vote her shares under such an agreement. 1" Furthermore, "[h]orizontal
5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-220 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-300 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-310 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
8. Ortega, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 203.
9. Brief of Appellant at 4 (citing SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White, 309 S.C. 146, 148, 420
S.E.2d 514, 515 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, _ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 868 (1994) for the proposition
that an agreement to waive provisions of the law intended to protect the waiving party should be
closely scrutinized).
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-8-105 to -106 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (governing terms of
directors and staggering of terms). Section 33-8-106 was subsequently modified by 1994 Acts
461, § 6, effective June 29, 1994, reducing the number of directors required for a staggered
board from nine to six. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-106 (Supp. 1994). Under the Association's
bylaws, the board of directors was limited to no more than five persons.
11. Ortega, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 203.
12. Brief of Appellant at 4.
13. Ortega, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 204. Nor did the court of appeals discuss the
Association's lengthy argument that the doctrines of res judicata, laches and estoppel stemming
from the previous suits brought by dissatisfied owners mandated dismissal of Ortega's action.
Brief of Appellee at 12-22.
14. Ortega, _ S.C. at_, 442 S.E.2d at 203-04 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-7-310 and
1995]
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property regimes are administered by the bylaws incorporated into the master
deed or lease. ... [and] [e]ach co-owner must comply with the bylaws and
with the administrative rules and regulations set forth in the master deed. "1
The court indicated that a staggered board provision is usually valid, but
in this case the Association's provision in its bylaws did not meet the statutory
requirements because it provided for only a five member board instead of the
mandated nine.16 In addition, the provision was internally inconsistent
because it would be impossible for at least two members to serve three-year
terms, at least two members to serve two-year terms, and all other members
to serve one-year terms if the number of board members ever dropped to the
minimum of three. Thus, the court upheld the board vote provision, but
invalidated the staggered board provision. 7
South Carolina passed statutes governing vacation time sharing plans in
1978.1' The legislature recognized that high-pressure sales tactics are
common in the sale of timeshares and the law reflects a clear intent to protect
potential buyers. 9 Timeshare sellers must register with the South Carolina
Real Estate Commission.' Sellers must keep copies of all sales contracts and
records of all employees for the previous three years.2 ' Sellers must disclose
specific information in a sales contract, including the total price, and may not
misrepresent the use of promotional devices.' Perhaps the strongest protec-
tion for a buyer is the so-called "cooling-off period." A buyer has four days
in which to cancel a contract, and a seller must refund all payments made by
a buyer within 20 days.' Furthermore, a sales contract must explain a
buyer's right of cancellation in specific language set in bold, capitalized type
33-7-220(d)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1990)). An irrevocableproxy is proper under § 33-7-220(d)(5)when
the appointment form conspicuously states that it is irrevocable and the appointee is a party to
a voting agreement created under § 33-7-310. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-220(d)(5) (Law. Co-op.
1990). The court of appeals did not discuss whether Ortega had signed away her proxy on a form
that "conspicuously" made her aware of that fact.
15. Ortega, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 204 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31-150, -170
(Law. Co-op. 1991)).
16. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 204.
17. Id. at 442 S.E.2d at 204. The Association's staggered board provision would be valid
today under the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1994, which does not require a
specific number of members in order to have a staggered board. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-31-805,
-806 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -250 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
19. For a detailed discussion of the timeshare statutes, see Michelle D. Brodie, Note,
Regulation of Time Sharing in South Carolina, 37 S.C. L. REv. 527 (1986).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-30 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-100, -110 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-50, -60 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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next to a contract's signature line and on a separately signed acknowledge-
ment.24
In view of the foregoing provisions, buyers may reasonably believe that
they should not be bound by obscure voting provisions inserted in a master
deed and bylaws by developers who are obviously motivated to some degree
by self interest. The court of appeals in Ortega, however, did not focus on the
timeshare statutes. Indeed, the outcome in Ortega is consistent with the
approach taken by South Carolina appellate courts in the dozen or so decisions
handed down since 1974 in which those courts have discussed master deed or
bylaws provisions in a condominium setting.
Courts have repeatedly examined and enforced such provisions. In
Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp. ,25 for example, individual
condominium owners in a project that went into default disagreed with the
developer and the bank over who would pay to replace an improperly built
roof. The supreme court noted that "[t]he rights and authority of the [horizon-
tal property] Regime must be gleaned from the Horizontal Property Act and
from the master deed."26
A court is not likely to consider extrinsic evidence when documents
incorporated by reference into a master deed make that deed unambiguous. In
Walters v. Summey Building Systems, Inc.27 the buyer objected to paying
annual fees for a three-bedroom unit when he owned only a two-bedroom unit.
The court concluded that the buyer was on constructive notice of the size and
floor plan of the condominium bought at auction, but lowered his fees because
it was unfair for the management to charge him for square footage he did not
own. Plats and documents referred to in the master deed became part of the
deed, and thus made it unambiguous. "The construction of an unambiguous
deed is a question of law, not fact. The terms of such a deed may not be
varied or contradicted by evidence drawn from sources other than the deed
itself. "2
Because of judicial reluctance to use extrinsic evidence, a court is likely
to enforce the precise terms of provisions and covenants in a master deed and
bylaws. In Lovering v. Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n29 the bylaws
gave the condominium owners association the power to levy annual mainte-
nance fees based on the assessed value of each owner's property. The
association's board tried to charge an emergency assessment for beachfront
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-40(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
25. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
26. Id. at 421, 321 S.E.2d at 49.
27. __ S.C. __, 429 S.E.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1993).
28. Id. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Vause v. Mikell, 290 S.C. 65, 68, 348 S.E.2d
187, 189 (Ct. App. 1986)).
29. 289 S.C. 77, 344 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 1986), aff'd as nodified, 291 S.C. 201, 352
S.E.2d 707 (1987) (per curiam).
19951
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renourishment and the rebuilding of bridges damaged by salt water. The court
agreed with the protesting owners that the bylaws as written gave the
association's board the power to levy annual maintenance fees, but not
emergency fees:30
[A] similar rule of strict construction applies to the enforcement of
covenants against real property. Covenants purporting to impose affirmative
obligations on the grantee are to be strictly construed and not enforced unless
the obligation is imposed in clear and unambiguous language which is
sufficiently definite to guide the courts in its application... The general
statement of corporate purposes relied on is not sufficient, standing alone, to
authorize the levying of special assessments on property owners. In order to
constitute an enforceable power of assessment in the Association, an assessment
provision must: (1) express a sufficiently definite standard by which to measure
liability for the assessment; (2) describe with particularity the property to be
maintained; and (3) provide an ascertainable standard by which the purpose for
which the assessment is levied can be objectively determined... A standard
such as "any other thing necessary or desirable in the opinion of the Board of
Directors" is too vague to be enforceable.
3'
In affirming the court of appeals' decision in Lovering, the supreme court
explained that "[i]mplied or incidental powers are those which are reasonably
necessary to the execution of the corporation's express powers, not those
which are merely convenient or useful."3 2
On the other hand, a court will likely uphold a decision to levy an
emergency fee when an association's governing board clearly has that power
and follows the required procedures. Before the court will overturn the board's
decision, a protesting owner must demonstrate that the board acted fraudulent-
ly or in bad faith. A court, adhering to the business judgment rule, should not
overrule the board simply because it believes the board made a bad deci-
sion.33
30. Id. at 81-82, 344 S.E.2d at 864-65.
31. Id. at 82-83,344 S.E.2d at 865-66 (citing Snug Harbor Property Owners Ass'n v. Curran,
284 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 291 S.E.2d 151 (1982) and Beech Mountain
Property Owners Ass'n v. Seifart, 269 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)).
32. Lovering v. Seabrooklsland Property Owners Ass'n, 291 S.C. 201,203,352 S.E.2d 707,
708 (1987) (per curiam) (citing South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v South Carolina Pub. Sery.
Auth., 215 S.C. 193, 54 S.E.2d 777 (1949) and Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200
S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942)).
33. Dockside Ass'n v. Detyens, 291 S.C. 214, 216-17, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ct. App.)
(finding that the board had the power to levy an emergency fee without getting the approval of
the majority of owners, where the master deed and bylaws gave the board such powers and the
board followed specified procedures), aft'd, 294 S.C. 86, 362 S.E.2d 874 (1987) (per curiam).
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Provisions and restrictive covenants in a master deed and bylaws apply
with equal force to both parties to a transaction. In Hoffman v. Cohen34 the
original developer imposed a restrictive covenant in 1941 that allowed only
residential development on oceanfront property in Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina. The location grew into a neighborhood of single-family homes. A
developer decided to build a 62-unit condominium project on two beachfront
lots in the early 1970s. Neighboring homeowners objected. A divided supreme
court concluded that the frequent rental of condominiums is a commercial-type
operation that would violate the single-family scheme of the subdivision and
therefore the developer's plan would violate the restrictive covenant.
35
Sometimes judges disagree on the meaning of a covenant as pointedly as
the parties in a dispute. In Harvey v. Marsh Hawk Plantation5 a developer
wanted to cut down most of the trees in areas where condominiums had not
been built. Condominium owners protested that such an act would violate a
restrictive covenant imposed on the entire 430-acre site by the master deed and
referenced documents. The master-in-equity and court of appeals agreed,
forbidding the developer from cutting the trees.37 The developer argued that
a provision under which it could grant permission to cut down a tree gave it
the authority to waive the covenant entirely. The court of appeals disagreed.
"To interpret [the provision] as espoused by [the developer] would be akin to
allowing the fox to guard the henhouse." 31 On appeal, the supreme court,
however, decided the hens had no reason to worry. Reassured by developer's
counsel at oral argument that the developer would use "good forest manage-
ment techniques" and that it had no plans to clear-cut the site, the supreme
court allowed the developer to proceed because its plan was "consistent with
the general goal [of the covenant] to preserve the natural environment insofar
as possible."39
While a person may have the right to enforce a provision in the bylaws
or master deed, he or she may lose that right by failing to act expeditiously.
34. 262 S.C. 71, 202 S.E.2d 363 (1974).
35. Id. at 76, 202 S.E.2d at 366. The court outlined a few time-honored rules. "Restrictive
covenants are contractual in nature. The cardinal rule of construction in interpreting any contract
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. Such intent should, as nearly as
possible, be gleaned from the instrument itself." Id. at 75, 202 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Nance v.
Waldrop, 258 S.C. 69, 187 S.E.2d 226 (1972)). "[R]estrictive covenants are to be construed
most strictly against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them," but the court should not
apply the rule to defeat the obvious purpose of a restriction. Id. at 76, 202 S.E.2d at 366 (citing
Sprouse v. Winston, 212 S.C. 176, 46 S.E.2d 874 (1948)).
36. 307 S.C. 255, 414 S.E.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 310 S.C. 355, 426 S.E.2d 792
(1993).
37. Id. at 258-60, 414 S.E.2d at 589-90.
38. Id. at 260, 414 S.E.2d at 590.
39. Harvey, 310 S.C. at 357, 426 S.E.2d at 793 (1993).
1995]
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In Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas Horizontal Property Regime" the manager
of a Hilton Head development tried to force a condominium owner to remove
certain landscaping plants and fixtures. The owner had talked to the managers
about the clearly visible improvements at least once. The court agreed that the
covenant was valid, but upheld the master-in-equity's ruling in favor of the
owner because the manager had waited four years to enforce the covenant. The
manager was equitably estopped from trying to enforce the covenant because
he had waived the right of enforcement.4
Sometimes a homeowners association wishes to change a covenant for
worthwhile reasons, but the court rejects such an effort because the covenant
still serves its intended purpose. In Shipyard Propery Owners' Ass'n v.
Mangiaracina42 the association sought authority through a declaratory
judgment action to alter a disparate fee structure contained in thirty-two
separate sets of restrictive covenants adopted since the mid-1 970s at the Hilton
Head development. About fifteen percent of the condominium owners paid an
annual fixed fee of $50 to $100 a year to maintain common property while
everyone else paid a variable fee which, on average, was $385. The
association argued that conditions had changed so much that the fixed-rate
covenant should no longer apply, but the court disagreed. "To defeat
enforcement of covenants restricting the use of land, changed conditions must
be so radical as to practically destroy the essential objects and purposes of the
covenants."
43
The principles outlined above apply to a transaction regardless of the
manner in which the buyer purchased the condominium, whether at an auction
or a court-ordered sale. In Harrington v. Blackston 4 the master-in-equity
ordered a bankrupt condominium project to be sold subject to provisions
contained in the master deed. The court rejected the buyer's argument that he
purchased the site free of master deed restrictions, but remanded the case to
determine whether the deed should be reformed so that the restrictions applied
only to portions of the property already devoted to condominiums. 45
40. 307 S.C. 339, 415 S.E.2d 384 (1992).
41. Id. at 345, 415 S.E.2d at 388.
42. 307 S.C. 299, 414 S.E.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1992).
43. Id. at 308, 414 S.E.2d at 801 (citing Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538
(1949)). The court also rejected the association's effort to prove that the variable-rate covenant
was a reciprocal negative easement that applied to all the property. To do so the association had
to show (1) a common grantor, (2) designation of land subject to restriction, (3) a general scheme
of restrictions, and (4) covenants running with the land in accordance with that scheme. The
association failed to prove there was a general scheme because, although every lot does not have
to be restricted in exactly the same way, extensive omissions such as the ones in question tend
to show no scheme existed. Furthermore, a reciprocal negative easement is never retroactive. Id.
at 309, 414 S.E.2d at 801-02 (citing Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925)).
44. - S.C. _, 429 S.E.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1993).
45. Id. at _, 429 S.E.2d at 830.
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In fact, a court may apply the Horizontal Property Act" and accompany-
ing principles in a condominium setting even though a technicality prohibits
a development from falling within the Act. In Battery Homeowners Ass'n v.
Lincoln Financial Resources, Inc.47 the master deed did not mention the term
"horizontal property regime," as required by statute." Nevertheless, the
supreme court looked to the master deed and bylaws to decide that the
association had the power to assess and collect fees from the builder of ten
new units.49
Provisions in a master deed and bylaws may at times give way to
overriding government powers. In Anchor Point, Inc. v. Shoals Sewer Co."0
condominium owners claimed the state Public Service Commission did not
have the power to set rates for the project's sewer system because the master
deed placed those rates in the hands of the owners' association. The owners
argued that allowing the commission to set rates would violate their constitu-
tional right to contract. The supreme court disagreed and concluded that the
sewer company was a public utility in which there was a public interest.
"[T]he right to contract is not absolute; it is subject to the state's police
powers which may be exercised for the protection of the public's health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."'
When a person violates a bylaw or covenant, an aggrieved party usually
seeks an injunction to force compliance with the rule. Courts generally grant
injunctive relief regardless of whether the plaintiff has suffered any actual
damages. In Houck v. Rivers5 2 the plaintiff owned a carriage house, which
he leased to a third party, behind a three-story home in historic downtown
Charleston, South Carolina. The seller had designated the property as a
condominium regime in order to subdivide it, and bylaws incorporated into the
master deed stated that the units could be used only as residences. Houck
brought a declaratory action seeking to prevent the defendant from running a
bed and breakfast business in the main house.53
In discussing its decision to order the defendant to eliminate the bed and
breakfast operation, the court noted that "an injunction, like all equitable
remedies, is granted as a matter of sound judicial discretion, and not as a
matter of legal right."s" However,
46. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31-10 to -440 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
47. 309 S.C. 247, 422 S.E.2d 93 (1992).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-100(e) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
49. Battery Homeowners, 309 S.C. at 250, 422 S.E.2d at 95.
50. 308 S.C. 422, 418 S.E.2d 546 (1992).
51. Id. at 428-29, 418 S.E.2d at 549-50.
52. _ S.C. _, 450 S.E.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
53. Id. at _,450 S.E.2d at 107.
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the right of a plaintiff to an injunction to enforce restrictive covenants has
long received special treatment. . . . As a general rule, a restrictive
covenant will be enforced irrespective of the amount of damage which will
result from the breach, and even though there is no substantial monetary
damage to the complainant by reason of the violation.
55
Furthermore, "[t]he difficulty of establishing damages is generally recognized
as a basis for awarding an injunction."56
In sum, Ortega and earlier cases clearly demonstrate that a buyer of a
timeshare condominium will receive no special treatment by the courts, despite
legislative recognition of timeshare sellers' propensity to mislead potential
buyers. A court will enforce provisions and covenants contained in the master
deed, bylaws, and referenced documents, and will consider the buyer to be on
constructive notice of those documents. Perhaps the legislature should require
timeshare sellers to prominently disclose additional aspects of a project,
particularly annual fee schedules and the structure of governing boards. Until
that happens, however, buyers should ask more questions and read not only
the glossy brochures, but also the less exciting fine print.
R. David Proffitt
II. COURT CLARIFIES APPLICABILITY OF
MISTAKEN BELIEF RULE TO ADVERSE POSSESSION SUITS
In Perry v. Heirs of Gadsden' the South Carolina Supreme Court clarified
when the rule of mistaken belief can be applied to claims of title through
adverse possession. The supreme court affirmed the opinion of the court of
appeals, but rejected the court of appeals' alternative holding that "a claim for
adverse possession does not lie under a mistaken belief that the property is
one's own and with no intent to claim against the property's true owner." 2 In
rejecting this alternative holding, the court clearly indicated that the mistaken
belief rule applies only to boundary disputes between adjacent landowners and
not to disputes concerning an entire tract of land
Perry arose out of a claim brought by the daughters of Herman Gadsden
against their uncle, Cecil J. Gaston, Jr.4 (Cecil Jr.), and against the heirs of
55. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 109.
56. Id. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 110 (citing Mets, 158 S.C. 411, 155 S.E. 734).
1. _ S.C. _, 449 S.E.2d 250 (1994) (per curiam).
2. Id. at , 449 S.E.2d at 251.
3. Id. at _,449 S.E.2d at 251.
4. The parties inconsistently used Gaston and Gadsden as the same last name. Perry v. Heirs
of Gadsden, _ S.C. -, - n. 1,437 S.E.2d 174, 176 n. 1 (Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam), aff'd
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their grandfather, Cecil J. Gadsden, Sr. (Cecil Sr.).' The daughters sought
partition of a 110.5 acre tract of land6 occupied by Cecil Jr., as well as
punitive damages for misrepresentation and conversion of timber, and an
accounting.7 Cecil Sr. died intestate in 1929 and was survived by six children
- Cornelius, Cecil Jr., Herman, John, Frances, and Carrie.! Frances and
John died without leaving spouses or children; Herman and Carrie died leaving
children. Cornelius conveyed his undivided interest in the land to Cecil Jr.9
In 1983 Cecil Jr. obtained a quitclaim deed to the entire 110.5 acres so
that he could sell the timber on the land." In obtaining the quitclaim deed,
Cecil Jr. fraudulently concealed the existence of the heirs of Herman and
Carrie.I Cecil Jr. claimed to have been deeded title to the 74 acre tract and
been given the right to occupy the 41 acre tract for life by Cecil Sr. Cecil Jr.
could, however, provide no documentation to support his claim.' 2 Alterna-
tively, Cecil Jr. contended that even if the deed never existed, he had title to
the 74 acre tract by virtue of adverse possession."
The court of appeals held that Cecil Jr.'s adverse possession claim failed
due to a lack of hostile possession. In South Carolina, a claim of title through
adverse possession requires that the possession of the property in question be
actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for the entire time
period required by statute.' 4 Hostile possession is defined as "possession with
intention to dispossess the owner."'" The court of appeals found that Cecil Jr.
lacked the requisite hostile intent because he had repeatedly assured Herman's
heirs that he intended to share the property with them and that he was
as modified, _ S.C. _, 449 S.E.2d 250 (1994) (per curiam).
5. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 176.
6. The 110.5 acre tract of land had been formed from two separatetracts, one of approximate-
ly 74 acres, and the other of approximately 41 acres. Both tracts were eventually acquired by
Cecil Sr. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 176.
7. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 176.
8. Id. at _,437 S.E.2d at 176.
9. Perry, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 176.
10. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 176.
11. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 176.
12. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 176.
13. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 177.
14. Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 61, 367 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1988) ("To establish adverse
possession, the Fobbs had the burden of proving their possession of the tracts had been actual,
open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive for a period of ten years.") (citing Davis v.
Monteith, 289 S.C. 176, 345 S.E.2d 724 (1986)); see also Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487,
491, 118 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1961) ("[P]ossessionmust be actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous
and exclusive for the whole statutory period."); Lusk v. Callaham, 287 S.C. 459, 461, 339
S.E.2d 156, 157-58 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Proof of adverse possession required Lusk to show that
his possessionof the property in question was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and
hostile for the entire statutory period of ten years.").
15. Lusk, 287 S.C. at 461, 339 S.E.2d at 158.
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protecting and preserving their interests. 16 Thus, Cecil Jr. displayed no intent
to dispossess the other owners.
As an alternative ground, the court of appeals found that Cecil Jr.'s claim
of title through adverse possession also failed because he claimed to be under
the mistaken belief that he owned the 74 acre tract. The court of appeals,
relying on Lusk v. Callaham,7 held that "[n]o claim for adverse possession
lies under a mistaken belief that property is one's own and with no intent to
claim against the property's true owner."' 8 In Lusk the court of appeals had
held that "[iln South Carolina, unlike in most other jurisdictions, possession
under a mistaken belief that property is one's own and with no intent to claim
against the property's true owner cannot constitute hostile possession." 9
The supreme court agreed that because Cecil Jr. had "repeatedly assured
the heirs that he intended to share the property with them and their interest
would be preserved and protected, "" the necessary element of hostility was
not present. While the supreme court affirmed on this ground, it rejected the
court of appeals' alternative holding that Cecil Jr.'s claim for adverse
possession also failed because he mistakenly thought that he owned 74 acres
of the tract. The supreme court found that the court of appeals had misapplied
Lusk. According to the supreme court, the mistaken belief rule "is applicable
only to cases involving boundary disputes between adjoining landowners.
Here, this case involves a dispute over an entire tract of land; therefore, the
mistaken belief rule set forth in Lusk is inapplicable."2
Application of the mistaken belief rule to boundary disputes has been set
out in numerous South Carolina cases, the most notable of which are Lynch
v. Lynch and Brown v. Clemens.' In Lynch the supreme court held:
[The occupancy of land beyond the true boundary line, by an encroaching
owner, does not form a basis for adverse possession, unless the encroach-
ment is made with an intention to claim and hold adversely. Where one is
in the possession of land up to a supposed line [and] intends to claim only
to the true line, his possession is not hostile and will not ripen into title.24
In Brown the supreme court again applied the rule that "a claim of
adverse possession fails where an encroaching neighbor is under a mistaken
16. Perry, __ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 177.
17. 287 S.C. 459, 339 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
18. Perry, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 177.
19. Lusk, 287 S.C. at 461, 339 S.E.2d at 158.
20. Perry, __ S.C. at __, 449 S.E.2d at 251.
21. Id. at __, 449 S.E.2d at 251.
22. 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d 301 (1960).
23. 287 S.C. 328, 338 S.E.2d 338 (1985) (per curiam).
24. 236 S.C. at 623, 115 S.E.2d at 306-307.
[Vol. 47
11
et al.: Property Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
PROPERTY LAW
belief as to boundary location and therefore lacks intention to dispossess the
true owner."21
While both Lynch and Brown made clear that the mistaken belief rule
applied to boundary dispute cases, in Wigfall v. Fobbs26 the supreme court
declined to apply the rule to adverse possession claims involving an entire tract
of land. Specifically, the supreme court stated that "[b]ecause this case does
not involve a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners, the rule in
Brown and Lynch is inapplicable. Further, we decline to extend the rule to
cases involving adverse possession of a tract of land."27 Therefore, a
mistaken belief in ownership will not prevent possession of an entire tract of
land from being hostile.'
Historically, mistaken boundary cases have fallen under two distinct lines
of reasoning. The majority rule was first set out in French v. Pearce,2 9 which
states:
Mhe person who enters on land believing and claiming it to be his own,
does thus enter and possess. The very nature of the act is an assertion of
his own title, and the denial of the title of all others. It matters not, that
the possessor was mistaken, and had he been better informed, would not
have entered on the land.30
Under this objective approach, the intent of the possessor is irrelevant.
The minority rule, as expressed most notably in Preble v. Maine Central
Railroad," takes a subjective approach to border disputes. Under Preble,
"one who by mistake occupies... land not covered by his deed, with no
intention to claim title beyond his actual boundary, wherever that may be, does
not thereby acquire title by adverse possession to land beyond the true
line."32 Thus, the
intention of the occupant to claim the ownership of land not embraced in
his title is a necessary element of adverse possession; and in case of
occupancy by mistake beyond a line capable of being ascertained this
intention to claim title to the extent of the occupancy must appear to be
absolute, and not conditional; otherwise the possession will not be deemed
adverse to the true owner. It must be an intention to claim title to all land
25. 287 S.C. at 331, 338 S.E.2d at 339.
26. 295 S.C. 59, 367 S.E.2d 156 (1988).
27. Id. at 61-62, 367 S.E.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. 8 Conn. 439 (1831).
30. Id. at 445.
31. 27 A. 149 (Me. 1893).
32. Id. at 150.
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within a certain boundary on the face of the earth, whether it shall
eventually be found to be the correct one or not.
33
While South Carolina continues to adhere to the minority rule, other states
have abandoned the reasoning of Preble. For example, in Mannillo v.
Gorski34 the Supreme Court of New Jersey articulated many of the rationale
that have proven persuasive in the majority jurisdictions. In so doing, the New
Jersey court stated that the Preble rule "rewards the possessor who entered
with a premeditated and predesignated 'hostility'-the intentional
wrongdoer[-]and disfavors an honest, mistaken entrant." 35 The court also
noted that "the true owner does not rely upon entry of the possessor by
mistake as a reason for not seeking to recover possession. Whether or not the
entry is caused by mistake or intent, the same result eventuates-the true
owner is ousted from possession."36 Accordingly, the court discarded "the
requirement that the entry and continued possession must be accompanied by
a knowing intentional hostility"37 and, instead, held that "any entry and
possession for the required time which is exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted,
visible and notorious, even though under mistaken claim of title, is sufficient
to support a claim of title by adverse possession.""
Whatever the merits of the minority and majority views, the significance
of Perry is that the court of appeals attempted to expand the reach of the
Preble rule to include cases involving a dispute over an entire tract of land,
not just a boundary. In rejecting this approach, the South Carolina Supreme
Court made it clear that where an entire tract of land is involved, a mistaken
belief of ownership will not cause a claim of adverse possession to fail for lack
of hostility. Although the court did not explain why the mistaken belief rule
should apply to one set of cases and not to the other, the court has reinforced
the binding nature of the precedent it previously set in Wigfall.
Kara L. Spencer
33. Id.
34. 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969); see also Joiner v. Janssen, 421 N.E.2d 170, 175 (II1. 1981)
("The difficulty with the subjective test is that it affords no protection to the landowner who
innocently and mistakenly occupies and improves land beyond his boundaries. He can never
acquire title thereto. Conversely, he who deliberately sets out to steal adjacent land may
succeed.").
35. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 261 (citation omitted).
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